poisoning

Scraped data changes under you and anyone can write to the web. The scored answer snapshots and hashes what was collected, records where it came from, filters what it can, and keeps enough lineage to undo a mistake.

Poisoning a knowledge base is cheaper than poisoning a model. The answer that scores starts from who can write to the corpus and limits what a poisoned chunk can achieve.

Most bad retrieval is a quality bug; some of it is an attack or an access failure. The scored answer separates the cases quickly and checks the security ones first.

An integrity investigation with three suspects: the sources, the index and the model. The scored answer uses versions and provenance to tell them apart quickly.

The most similar chunk is often the one written to be retrieved. The answer adds provenance to every chunk, ranks with it outside the model, and refuses to let text declare its own authority.

Research has shown a handful of planted documents can steer targeted answers. The defence is not a detector that recognises poison; it is control over who can write, staged promotion, and a risk estimate that multiplies the stages.

Breaking a model means different things to different attackers. What they can touch (training data, the API, the weights) decides what they can do.