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authorization

AI security interview questions tagged authorization, across every topic.

19 questions · 4 unlocked for you

Concepts behind "authorization"

Explanations of the mechanisms these questions rely on.

Foundational
Identity & Access
Authentication versus AuthorizationAuthentication establishes who a caller is: a user, a service or an agent acting for someone. Authorization decides what that caller may do with a specific resource right now. They are separate checks that fail in separate ways. Most real access-control bugs are authorization failures on authenticated requests, and AI agents add a third question: on whose behalf is this action being taken?
Foundational
Identity & Access
Access-Control Models: RBAC, ABAC and ReBAC in DepthEvery authorization model answers one question: may this subject perform this action on this resource, in this context? RBAC answers with roles and is easy to review but explodes when roles start encoding objects or context. ABAC evaluates attributes and is expressive but hard to audit. ReBAC follows relationships such as owner, member and parent folder, as Google's Zanzibar does at millions of checks per second. Real systems combine them, and the hard parts are deny semantics, list filtering, stale permissions and agents acting for users.
Foundational
Identity & Access
The Confused DeputyA confused deputy is a program that holds authority and is tricked into using it on behalf of a less privileged party. The problem was named in 1988 and reappears in OAuth proxies, cloud services that act for customers, and, most sharply, in AI agents: a model holding a user's or a service's credentials can be steered by text from anyone. The fix is to make each action carry the authority of the party that requested it, not the deputy's own.
Core
Application SecuritySign in
Broken Access Control and IDORBroken access control covers every way a user acts outside their intended permissions: reading other users' objects by changing an ID (IDOR, or broken object-level authorization), calling privileged functions directly, changing fields they should not (mass assignment), or crossing tenant boundaries. It tops both the OWASP web and API risk lists because authorization must be correct on every endpoint. Central policy, object-level checks in the data layer and two-user tests prevent most of it.