Wiz Cloud, Container & AI Infrastructure Security interview questions

One link-local address hands out the machine's credentials to anything that can make a request from it. That includes a fooled agent with a fetch tool.

Many ML tools assume they run on a trusted network and offer 'run this code' as a feature. Put them on the internet and that feature is remote code execution.

Most cloud breaches start with a setting, not an exploit. The scored answer moves those settings into reviewed code, checks them before deployment, and catches the drift that happens anyway.

Cloud attackers mostly use the same APIs your engineers do. The scored answer collects the right logs, writes detections for attacker behaviour, and keeps the logs out of the attacker's reach.

Everything in Kubernetes goes through the API server, so most attacks are about who can talk to it and with what rights. The rest is what a pod can do to its node and to its neighbours.

Most escapes are not clever kernel exploits. They are configuration that handed the container the host: a privileged flag, a mounted socket, a host path or a shared namespace.

Inference servers are built to run on a trusted machine, so most have no authentication and some trust their own network completely. Internet scans keep finding them anyway.

Snapshot a disk, read it somewhere else, delete the snapshot. That trick built a product category. Interviewers ask how it works, what permissions it needs, and what it cannot see.

Four open-source tools, four different questions: what happened, what is the state now, is this behaviour forbidden, and can the kernel stop it. Choosing well starts with knowing which question each answers.

IAM decides what a role may do; organisation guardrails decide what no role in an account may ever do. The scored answer explains the evaluation, the blind spots and a first set worth deploying.

RBAC decides who may create a pod; admission decides what kind of pod may exist. The scored answer layers the built-in options, handles webhook failure modes and remembers that the admission path is itself attack surface.

The question is really 'what does hostile code have to break to reach the host?' Answer that for each option and the choice follows.

The provider secures the model service. Everything you put into it, connect to it and build on top of it is still yours.

Every layer parses something an attacker wrote, every request costs real money, and tenants share hardware. Walk the path and price each risk.

Assume the code is hostile and design until that stops mattering. Then the interviewer adds a GPU and the internet, and you design again.

One copy is a total loss. The design is about how few places weights exist, how few people can touch them, and whether a bulk copy can leave unnoticed.

Training clusters hold the data and the weights, and run code from hundreds of dependencies. Default-deny egress is the control that holds when everything else is fooled.